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Abstract
This paper analyses how entry by an international bank into a developing economy a¤ects the credit
market equilibrium. It o¤ers a novel explanation of how a foreign entrant overcomes asymmetric in-
formation problems, and complements extant hard vs. soft information based theories of credit market
segmentation. In the model, the banks are protected by limited liability. This introduces an agency
problem since, in certain states of the world, it is optimal for the banks to lend to negative net present
value projects. The agency problem has an asymmetric impact on the local and the foreign bank. The
model illustrates how the diversication of the foreign banks loan portfolio eliminates the agency prob-
lem. In contrast, in certain states of the world, the agency problem frustrates the local banks ability to
raise nance. The paper explores the importance of the foreign banks ability to provide nance during
local liquidity shortages, and illustrates how this can lead to a segmentation of the credit market. In
equilibrium, the foreign bank nances local rms with a low exposure to the local economy, and the local
bank nances rms with a high exposure to the local economy. The model predicts, that foreign entry
increases the domestic nancial sectors vulnerability to liquidity shocks.
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1 Introduction
Many ressources have been devoted to the discussion about whether the entry of foreign nancial
intermediaries into developing economies is a blessing or a curse. Advocates of greater nancial
integration have argued, that the presence of foreign nancial intermediaries leads to better risk
management practices and more e¢ cient resource allocations. The opposition has pointed to the
nancial crises that followed the nancial liberalizations of the 1980s and 90s, and argued that in-
creased competition among nancial intermediaries aggravates agency problems and lead to greater
nancial instability. Currently, India and China are in the process of opening their nancial sectors
to foreign competition and many of the economies in Sub-Sahara Africa are experiencing renewed
foreign interest in their nancial sector. In this paper, I present a theoretical analysis of the impact
of foreign banks on the nancial sector of developing economies. I nd, that entry by foreign banks
can lead to a segmentation of the local credit market, and that this segmentation can aggravate
agency problems and reduce the resilience of the local nancial sector.
Developing economies are characterised by weak institutional infrastructure and opaque report-
ing standards. This leads to poor information transparency and uncertainty about the enforceability
of property rights. Given banksability to alleviate these problems through collateralised lending
and borrower screening and monitoring, it is no great surprise that bank lending is an important
source of nance to rms in developing economies. Thus, the analysis of how the credit market
and the local nancial sector is a¤ected by the presence of foreign banks is of particular relevance
to these economies.
This paper is motivated by empirical work which indicates, that the behaviour of foreign and
local banks di¤er signicantly across the business cycle. As the local economy goes through a
bust, local banks contract credit whilst foreign entrants expand credit (Haas and Lelyveld (2006),
Peek and Rosengreen (2000), Goldberg et al. (2000)). This suggests, that foreign banks lend to a
segment of the credit market which remains solvent as the local economy goes through a bust.
This paper aims to address two questions related to how foreign entry a¤ects the local credit
market. First, do foreign banks specialise in lending to a particular segment of the local market? I
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nd, that the foreign bank is a more stable source of nance, and that this renders it the preferred
nancier of local rms with a low exposure to local business conditions. Second, how do foreign
banks a¤ect the stability of the local nancial sector? The model suggests, that foreign entry
aggravates agency problems and raises the local nancial intermediaries exposure to liquidity shocks.
In the model, foreign entry reduces the diversication of the local banks loan portfolio. The local
bank operates under limited liability, so this raises their incentives to nance rms with unprotable
projects. To protect themselves against losses, depositors withdraw from the local bank when they
expect that it engages in risk shifting. Thus, an aggravation of the agency problem frustrates the
local banks ability to raise nance. The model explores how the foreign entrant can take advantage
of the local banks disability to raise nance, and use this to mitigate inferior information about
the local market.
The main idea is as follows. Consider the local economy prior to the entry of the foreign
bank. Two types of rms operate in the local economy. One produces for the local market, the
other produces for export. The business conditions in the foreign and the domestic market vary
independently of each other. To maintain their business, local rms must obtain nance from a
local bank which has perfect knowledge about the rmscreditworthiness. The local bank is funded
by deposits and operates under limited liability. This introduces the agency problem. The local
bank can retain gains from lending and shift losses to depositors, so it may be optimal for the local
bank to nance rms with unproftable projects.
Depositors observe a noisy signal about the average rmscreditworthiness and form rational
expectations about the local banks lending policy. Deposits are not subject to a credible deposit
insurance, so if the public signal is su¢ ciently adverse, it is optimal for the depositors to withdraw
their deposits from the bank. If the rms that produce for the local market constitute the majority
of the rms in the economy, the public signal tends to be unfavourable when the local business
conditions are poor. This is so even if the business conditions are prosperous for rms producing for
export. Thus, in certain states of the world, the local bank fails to raise deposits and creditworthy
rms which produce for export are denied nance.
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The foreign entrant is subject to limited liability and is funded by deposits. The entrant has
less information about the local economy than the incumbent, and its lending decisions can be
made contingent only on the rms type and on the public signal. The foreign bank is active in
many di¤erent economies, and therefore it has a well diversied portfolio. This reduces the agency
problem that arises from limited liability, and ties down the depositors expectations about the
foreign banks lending policy. When the portfolio is su¢ ciently well diversied, the agency problem
disappears and the foreign entrant can always raise deposits.
When the local economy goes through a bust, the public signal turns negative and the local
depositors withdraw from the local bank. In these states, the foreign bank becomes the monopoly
lender to solvent local rms. The prospect of extracting monopoly rents in future periods allows
the foreign entrant to contest the incumbentsinformation advantage. When the fraction of rms
producing for the local market is high, the public signal has a high correlation with the state of the
local economy. The disability for solvent local rmsto obtain nance from the local bank is there-
fore more pronounced for rms producing for export. Consequently, the foreign banks prospect
of extracting monopoly rents is higher when it nances exporters than when it nances rms that
produce for the local market. If the expected monopoly prots from lending to exporters is suf-
cient for the entrant to overcome the incumbents information advantage, and if the incumbents
information advantage prevails over the monopoly prots from lending to rms that produce for
the local economy, the credit market becomes segmented. The foreign bank lends to rms which
produce for export, and the local bank lends to rms which produce for the local market.
The mechanism behind the credit market segmentation has similarities with the idea presented in
Froot, Sharfstein and Stein (1993). Froot et al. analyse a rms optimal risk management decision
and conclude that risks which are adversely correlated with the rms future business opportunities
should be hedged. In the model, rms that produce for export borrow from the foreign entrant
since this eliminates their exposure to liquidity shocks in states where their business opportunities
are good.
The work presented in this paper is related to a number of recent papers that analyse how entry
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by foreign nancial intermediaries a¤ects the credit markets of developing economies (DellAriccia
and Marquez (2004), Detragiache et al. (2006), Sengupta (2007) and Gormley (2008)). As in the
model presented here, these papers predict, that entry by foreign nancial intermediaries leads to
a segmentation of the local credit market. Despite this similarity, the theoretical framework in this
paper di¤ers on a number of points from the existing models. First, in the extant literature, the
credit market segmentation arises from a trade o¤ between the distribution of information and the
cost for funds. The entrant has a lower cost of nance than the incumbent, but the incumbent
has an information advantage over the entrant. The model I present has the same information
asymmetry, but the entrant and the incumbent pays the same real cost of funds. The credit
market segmentation arises because the foreign entrant can extend credit as the local economy goes
through a bust; a service which arises endogeneously, and which is valuable only to rms with a
high probability of being solvent during busts of the local economy. Thus, the model suggests, that
foreign entrants can overcome information disadvantages even without access to cheaper nance.
Second, in the extant literature, the credit market segmentation is driven by the rmstrans-
parency (DellAriccia and Marquez (2004) and Detragiache (2006)), or the rms credit quality
(Gormley (2008) and Sengupta (2007)). In the model presented below, the rms are homogenous
across both credit quality and information transparency. The credit market segmentation is driven
by the correlation between the local rmsbusiness opportunities and the state of the local economy.
A number of papers study the occurrence of clientele e¤ects in credit markets with heterogeneous
banks. These studies suggest, that large banks have a comparative advantage in lending to rms
that produce hard information, and small banks have a comparative advantage in lending to rms
that produce soft information.1 The comparative advantages arise from the banksorganisational
structure (Williamson (1988)), or from the need to control agency problems between the banks
management and the local loan o¢ cers (Berger and Udell (2002), Stein (2002)). When applied
to the analysis of foreign bank entry, the large bank is interpreted as the foreign entrant, and the
1Hard information can be easily quantied and distributed to third parties. Typically, hard information can be found in a
rms annual report. Soft information cannot be quantied or transmitted to third parties. This type of information includes
whether the loan applicant appears trustworthy and hard working.
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small bank represents the local incumbent (Mian (2006)). In the model presented in this paper,
the agency problem that creates the clientele e¤ects is between the nancial intermediary and its
outside nanciers. The credit market segmentation is unrelated to the abilty to process information,
as the foreign entrant, over time, can obtain the same information as the local incumbent, and has
the same ability to process information. The segmentation of the credit market arises because the
more stable nance provided by the foreign entrant is valued higher by rms producing for export
than by rms producing for the local market.
This paper also contributes to the literature on how competition between nancial intermediaries
a¤ect nancial stability. In line with the work in Keeley (1990), Boot and Thakor (2000) and Allen
and Gale (2004), the model presented in this paper suggests, that increased competition aggravates
agency problems and leads to greater nancial fragility. In the extant literature, entry aggravates
the agency problems because it reduces the banks rents. In turn, this lowers their expected
return on screening and monitoring, and reduces their losses from being pushed into insolvency.
These e¤ects enhance the bankincentives to take risk. In contrast, in the model presented below,
the increased nancial fragility is driven by the credit market segmentation. Because the foreign
bank poaches one segment of the market, it reduces the diversication of the local banks loan
portfolio. As is well know (see for example Cerasi and Daltung (2000) and Tirole (2006)), a lower
diversication reinforces the local banks incentives to engage in risk shifting. Thus, the nancial
fragility presented in this paper arises from the market segmentation, and does not develop in a
setting where the entrant and the incumbent are symmetric.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of the local economy, and section
3 contains the analysis of the local economy prior to the entry of the foreign bank. This section
illustrates the source of the liquidity shock, and serves as a benchmark to evaluate the impact
of foreign bank entry. Section 4 analyses the foreign entrants behaviour and characterises the
equilibrium following the entry of the foreign bank. Section 5 outlines the theorys empirical
implications and reviews the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs are relegated
to the appendix.
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2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
Consider an economy with three time points (t = 0; 1; 2), a continuum of rms, one local bank and
a set of depositors. All agents are risk neutral and the rms are segmented into two types. Type
D rms, with measure , produce goods for the domestic market and type I rms, with measure
(1  ), produce goods for export. I assume that the measure of type D rms exceeds the measure
of type I rms, i.e.  > 12 .
At time t = 0 and t = 1, each rm has access to an investment project which requires one
unit of nance. The projects have a tenure of one period, two potential outcomes (success and
failure) and two di¤erent qualities (good and bad). Good projects succeed with probability PG
and bad projects succeed with probability PB, where PG > PB. Successful projects return X
and unsuccessful projects return 0. Only good projects are creditworthy, i.e. PGX   Rf > 0 and
PBX Rf < 0, where Rf is the rate of return on a risk-free asset. The projectsqualities vary over
time, such that a type i rm with a good project at time t may hold a bad project at time t+ 1. I
assume that this variation is independent over time, and that the probability of obtaining a good
project is equal across types, i.e. Pr (PDt = Pj) = Pr (PIt = Pj) for j 2 fG;Bg, where PDt and PIt
is the succes probability of respectively a type D rms project and a type I rms project at time
t.2
The rms are penniless and consume the returns from the projects immediately, so to initiate
a new project, they must obtain a loan from the bank. The rms own a stock of productive assets
which they can be pledge to the bank as collateral for the loan.3 The collateral is subject to a
liquidation ine¢ ciency, so if the bank is forced to liqudate the collateral, it recovers only a fraction
 < 1 of the face value of the collateral.4
2The assumption of independent identically distributed projects eases the exposition of the main idea. The model retains it
qualitative conclusions under the assumption of a positive (but not perfect) correlation between the projects and across time
time.
3The assets are assumed pivotal to the investment project and therefore, they cannot be sold to nance the investment.
4Traditionally, the collateral ine¢ ciency arises because the rms have the best knowledge about the redeployability of the
asests, or because the assets are most productive when held by the rms and therefore can only be sold at a discount.
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At each point in time, the depositors can invest either in demand deposits issued by the bank
or in the risk-free asset. The economy has no deposit insurance scheme, and deposits is the only
source of nance to the bank.
The local bank continues to operate in period two independent of the outcome of the projects
that it nances in period one. The banks discount factor is normalised to one.
2.2 Information structure
All agents observe the rms types and a noisy public signal about the credit quality of the average
rms project. The public signal, t, is given by
t = PDt + (1  )PIt + ~"t,
where Pjt 2 fPG; PBg for j 2 fD; Ig and ~"t is a noise term,
~"t  N
 
0; 2"

.
If the bank is the most recent lender to a particular rm (the "relationship lender"), it observes
the credit quality of the rms project.5 At time t = 0, the local bank is the relationship lender to
both types of rms. All the rms know the quality of their own projects.
All information is revealed simultaneously at the end of each period, so t and Pjt is known at
time t.
Depositors, and banks without prior lending relationships, observe only the rms types and the
public signal.
2.3 Financial contracts
The bank o¤ers one period loans to the rms. A loan extended at time t is described by a tuple
(Rt; Ct) where Rt and Ct is respectively the interest rate and the collateral requirement on the
loan.6 It is costless for the bank to verify both the outcome of a rms project, and whether the
5 Initially, there is only one bank which is the relationship lender to all borrowers. The possibility of a non-relationship lender
arises following the entry of the foreign bank.
6All interest rates are gross rates, i.e. they include both return of principal and accrued interest.
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rm diverted funds from the project. Loan contracts are subject to limited recourse, so the bank
can secure repayment of the loan only from the returns on the project and by liquidating the
collateral.
Demand deposits can be redeemed at any point in time, and carry an interest rate of t   (t).
2.4 Discussion of model setup
In the model, the rms that produce for the local market and the rms that produce for export
are subject to di¤erent shocks. The business conditions in the local economy can di¤er from the
business conditions in the export markets. This motivates, that both the quality and the outcomes
of the projects vary as a function of whether the rm produces for export or for local consumption.
The absence of deposit insurance it not supported empirically, but reects that the deposit in-
surance may be non-credible, cover only partial losses, or that settlement from the deposit insurance
may be subject to severe delays. Demirgüç-kunt et al. (2005) nd, that all banks are subject to
either explicit or implicit deposit insurance, but that the deposit insurance most frequently is only
partial and subject settlement delays. The run on Northern Rock in September 2007 underscores,
that when the depositors have a low degree of condence in the deposit insurance, they may behave
as if it is absent.
The information structure emphasises, that the bank can learn about the rmsbusiness through
lending. Bank loans are subject to covenants which gives the lender access to non-public information
about the rmsbusiness. The assumption that the relationship lender is the only lender to observe
the quality of an individual rms project, is a modelling abstraction to capture the information
transmitted through the lending relationship.
The local bank continues its operations in the second period even if the projects it nances in the
rst period fails. This assumption is motivated by the weak institutional infrastructure of developing
economies. First, given the information structure, it is ex post e¢ cient for a nancial regulator
to permit the local bank to continue its operations in the second period. A weak institutional
infrastructure may obstruct the nancial regulators ability to commit to a specic policy ex ante.
9
Second, if the repercussions against the loan o¢ cer that approved the loans which failed in the rst
period are low, say if it is easy for the loan o¢ cer to get a position at another nancial institution,
the loan o¢ cer may behave as if the bank continues to operate in period two.
3 Credit market equilibrium without foreign banks
In this section, I characterise the equilibrium prior to the entry of the foreign bank, and illustrate
the ine¢ ciency that causes the local rms to demand a more stable source of nance.
The equilibrium consists of a set of optimal actions and rational beliefs for each of the agents.
The local banks optimal lending policy varies as a function of the models primitives. To ease the
exposition, I impose a set of parameter constraints that xes the local banks lending policy. The
parameter constraints are set to minimize the agency problem that creates the liquidity shortages.
Let the state of the local economy be characterised by the variable Pt, where Pt  (PDtPIt).
Lemma 1 Under the parameter constraints, Rf > X; PG >  and 1   PB >  > PB, the local
bank lends only to type D rms when Pt = (PB; PB), and only to rms with good projects when
Pt 2 f(PB;PG) ; (PG;PB) ; (PG;PG)g.
Throughout the analysis I assume, that the parameter constraints in Lemma 1 are fullled. The
agency problem arises when Pt = (PB; PB). The local bank is protected by limited liability, so
in this state, it is optimal for the bank to nance rms with unprotable projects and shift the
potential losses to the depositors. Indeed, the parameter constraints in Lemma 1 minimizes the
agency problem, as risk shifting occurs only when Pt = (PB; PB).
3.1 The banks problem
The local bank is the relationship lender to both types of rms, and therefore, there are no informa-
tion imperfections in the model. Collateral is subject to a liquidation ine¢ ciency, so it is optimal
for the local bank to sort the rms without the use of collateral, i.e. Ct = 0. The local bank has
monopoly and therefore extends credit at the monopoly lending rate, Rt = X . The banks lending
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behaviour follows directly from Lemma 1. To maximize prots, the bank o¤ers demand deposit at
the deposit rate which render depositors indi¤erent between nancing the bank and investing in
the risk-free asset.
3.2 The depositorsproblem
Prior to their investment decision, the depositors observe the public signal, t, and form their beliefs
about the true state of the economy. Given the realisation of the public signal, the depositorsbeliefs
are given by,
Pr (Pt = (Pi; Pl) jt) =


t Pi (1 )Pl
"

Pr (PD = Pi) Pr (PI = Pl)
Pr (t)
, (1)
where i; l 2 fG;Bg,  () is the partial distribution function of the standard normal distribution,
and
Pr (t) = 
i;l2fG;Bg


t   Pi   (1  )Pl
"

Pr (PD = Pi) Pr (PI = Pl) ,
is the probability of the event t.
Irrespective of the value of the public signal, depositors assign a positive probability to the
occurrence of state Pt = (PB; PB). In this state, the local bank engages in risk shifting and nances
rms with unprotable projects. Consequently, when the depositors are su¢ ciently certain that
state Pt = (PB; PB) has materialised, i.e. when the public signal is su¢ ciently adverse, it is optimal
for them to withdraw their deposits from the bank. This implies the existence of a threshold value
of the public signal, , such that, the local bank fails to raise demand deposits if t < .
An additional condition for depositors to nance the bank is, that the expected return on
demand deposits weakly exceeds the return on the risk-free asset. The public signal determines the
expected return on demand deposits, so for any realisation of the public signal, there is a threshold
value of the deposit rate, t , such that, depositors nance the bank only of t  t .
Lemma 2 gathers these observations, and characterises the depositorsbehaviour.
Lemma 2 There is a unique value of t, , and a value of t, 

t , such that, the depositors nance
the bank only if t   and t  t .
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The noise in the public signal implies, that the event t < 
 can occur even when the true state
of the local economy is not Pt = (PB; PB). Consequently, the local economy can realise states where
one (or both) types of rms have good projects, but where the local bank fails to raise deposits and
therefore fails to nance the rms with protable projects. Subsequently, I refer to the occurrence
of these events as a liquidity shocks.
Denition 3 A liquidity shock is an event such that, the local bank fails to raise deposits and at
least one of the rms in the economy have a protable project.
Thus, based on denition (3), a liquidity occurs if t < 
 and Pt 2 f(PG; PG) ; (PG; PB) ; (PB;PG)g.
3.3 The rmsproblem
The rms are protected by limited liability and therefore always apply for nance. The bank can
verify whether the rm diverts money from the project, so the rm invests in the project when the
loan application is successful.
Proposition 4, combines the previous insights to characterise the equilibrium of the local economy
prior to the entry of the foreign bank. The proposition illustrates, that liquidity shocks arise
endogeneously in equilibrium.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the depositors beliefs are given by (1) and the depositors nance
the bank if and only if t   and X  t  t . The bank lends under the contract (X; 0) and
o¤ers demand deposits at t = t . Subject to the availability of deposits, the bank nances the rms
with good projects if Pt 2 f(PG; PB) ; (PB; PG) ; (PG; PG)g and only type D rms if Pt = (PB; PB).
The rms always apply for nance and invest in the project if the loan application is successful.
In equilibrium, liquidity shocks arise endogenously as the depositors attempt to protect them-
selves against risk shifting. The liquidity shocks are costly to the economy, as they force the rms
to forego protable investment opportunities. Since  > 12 , liquidity shoks occur more frequently
when type I rms hold good projects, than when type D rms hold good projects. To see this,
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note that
Pr (PD = PG \  < ) = Pr (PD = PG) Pr ( < jPD = PG)
= Pr (PD = PG)

Pr (PI = PG) 

   PG
"

+Pr (PI = PB) 

   PG   (1  )PB
"

;
and,
Pr (PI = PG \  < ) = Pr (PI = PG) Pr ( < jPI = PG)
= Pr (PI = PG)

Pr (PD = PG) 

   PG
"

+Pr (PD = PB) 

   PB   (1  )PG
"

;
where  () is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. When
 > 12 , Pr (PD = PG \  < ) < Pr (PI = PG \  < ), so liquidity shocks occur more frequently
when type I rms hold good projects than when the type D rms hold good project. This happens
since  > 12 implies, that the public signal has a higher correlation with the business conditions of
the type D rms than the business conditions of the type I rms.
The local economys exposure to liquidity shocks creates the demand for a more stable source of
nance. The subsequent section illustrates why this provides the foreign bank with the opportunity
to enter the local economy.
4 Credit market equilibrium and foreign bank entry
In this section, I model the foreign bank and illustrate why it constitutes a more stable source of
nance. Hereafter, I analyse how foreign bank entry a¤ects the credit market of the local economy.
4.1 The foreign bank
The foreign bank is nanced by deposits and is protected by limited liability on the group level.
It has a well established international presence, and can raise deposits and extend loans in N
economies. Each of these economies is a replica of the local economy, and I assume, that the
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realisation of the state variable, Pt, is independent across the economies.7 I assume, that the
depositors in any given economy know the number of markets in which the foreign bank is active,
and that they observe the public signal of their own economy only. The information structure
implies, that when the foreign bank enters a new economy, it can observe only the rms types
and the public signal. Through lending, the foreign bank can become a relationship lender and
obtain the ability to observe the quality of the local rmsprojects. I assume that the foreign bank
has been active in each of the N economies for at least one period prior to its entry into the local
market.
Proposition 5 illustrates, that under these assumptions, the foreign bank is always able to raise
nance.
Proposition 5 If Pr (PI = PG) > 0, then there exists a number of economies, N, such that, if
the foreign bank is active in more than N economies, it can always raise deposits.
The result in Proposition 5 exploits, that the agency problem can be controlled through the
diversication of the foreign banks loan portfolio. A high degree of diversication, i.e. a high
value of N , weakens the foreign banks incentives to engage in risk shifting, and therefore reinforces
the depositors incentives to nance the bank. Thus, the proposition suggests, that when the
diversifcation of the foreign banks business is su¢ ciently high, depositors behave as if their deposits
with the foreign bank were subject to a deposit insurance.
The proof of Proposition 5 relies on three lemmas. The rst states, that if the bank engages in
risk shifting, it is active in a limited number of economies, and therefore, its prots are bounded.
The intuition for this result is, that risk shifting is protable only if the bank can prevent the law
of large numbers from coming into play. Thus, for risk shifting to be protable, the bank must be
active in a limited number of economies.
The second lemma states, that when Pr (PI = PG) > 0, there is a value of N , N, such that,
when the bank is active in more than N economies, it nances rms with protable projects only.
7The independence assumption is made for expositional purposes only. The models conclusions require only that the state
of the economies is not perfectly correlated.
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The intuition for this result is as follows. The foreign bank obtains positive expected prots when
it nances type I rms with good projects. Tus, if the bank nances these rms only, its expected
(and realised) prots are stricly increasing in N . The losses from failed projects must be o¤set
against the gains from succesful projects before they can be shifted to the depositors. Therefore,
when N is large, the must bank incur the expected losses from nancing rms with bad projects.
This eliminates the incentive to nance rms with unprotable projects. Since the rst lemma
indicates that the banks expected prots from risk shifting are limited and the banks expected
prots from nancing type I rms with good projects only is strictly increasing in N , there is a
value of N such that the latter strategy dominates the former.
Finally, the last lemma states, that when N is large, rational depositors correctly anticipate the
foreign bank to refrain from lending to rms with unprotable projects. Therefore, the depositors
are always willing to hold demand deposits issued by the foreign bank. In e¤ect, as the number
of economies increases, depositors disregard the public signal about their local economy, as they
know that the bank nances only rms with protable projects.
In the ensuing analysis, I assume that N > N. Consequently, the foreign bank can always raise
deposits and nance rms with protable investment projects.
Let F be the deposit rate o¤ered by the foreign bank. Then, since the foreign bank nances
only rms with good projects in many economies, the law of large number implies that
F = Rf :
4.2 Equilibrium under foreign bank entry
The following section contains the body of the analysis. In this section I characterise the equilibrium
following the entry of the foreign bank, and illustrate why foreign bank entry raises the occurence
of liquidity shocks and leads to a segmentation of the credit market. Throughout the analysis, I
assume that the local banks ability to raise deposits is una¤acted by the presence of the foreign
bank.
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4.2.1 Preliminaries: strategic interaction and e¢ cient contracts
To ensure the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium, I assume that the sequential structure of
the competition between the banks is as follows. At stage one, the banks simultaneously o¤er a
loan contract to the rms. The outcome of stage one is observable to both lenders. At stage two,
the relationship lender has the opportunity to improve the contract it o¤ered at stage one.
The rms have a stock of productive assets, so the loans can be subject to collateral requirements.
Lemma 6 characterises the e¢ cient loan contracts.
Lemma 6 There exists a loan contract (the "competitive collateral contract"), which maximises
the return to the rms with good projects, and is accepted only by rms with good projects. Under
this contract, the lenders expected prots are zero. In addition, there exists a loan contract (the
"monopoly collateral contract") which maximises the returns to the lender, and is accepted only by
rms with good projects. Under this contract, the lenders expected prots are equal to the monopoly
prots. There exists a non-collateralised loan contract,
 
R; 0

, which is weakly preferred over the
competitive collateral contract by all rms with good projects. If a rm with a good project accepts
one unit of nance under this contract, the lender obtains an expected prot of c > 0.
The contracts in Lemma 6 exploits, that rms with bad projects have a higher probability of
failure than rms with good projects. This implies, that the former are more reluctant to post
collateral than the latter. Consequently, by xing the collateral requirement and the loan rate
appropriately, a collateralised loan contract can be used as a self-selection mechanism to sort rms
with good projects from rms with bad projects. Collateral is subject to a liquidation ine¢ ciency,
so the lender assigns a lower value to a collateralised loan than the rm. Thus, if the lender can
sort the rms without the use of collateral, it can o¤er the more e¢ cient non-collateralised loan
contract,
 
R; 0

.
4.2.2 The banksproblem under foreign bank entry
The model is solved by backwards induction. At time t = 1, the banks compete under asymmetric
information. For a given rm, the relationship lender can observe the quality of the project, whereas
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the non-relationship lender must use the public signal and the rms type to form Bayesian beliefs
about the project. The asymmetric information structure exposes the non-relationship lender to
adverse selection. The relationship lender matches the terms of the loan contract o¤ered by the
non-relationship lender when this is protable, and rejects the loan applicant when the contract
o¤ered by the non-relationship lender is unprotable. To protect itself against adverse selection,
the non-relationship lender o¤ers the competitive collateral contract. In response, if the rm holds
a good project, the relationship lender o¤ers the contract
 
R; 0

. This contract is weakly preferred
by rms with good projects, so the relationship lender obtains an expected prot of c.
The strategic interaction between the banks leads to a pure strategy equilibrium, but it implies
that more than one outcome can be supported as an equilibrium. The equilibria di¤er with respect
to the local banks incentives to engage in risk shifting. The models main transmission mechanism
is driven by the foreign banks ability to nance local rms during the liquidity shock. This
feature does not vary across the equilibria, so in the analysis below, I focus on the equilibrium
which minimizes the local banks incentives to engage in risk shifting. Lemma 7 characterizes this
equilibrium.
Lemma 7 At time t = 1, the relationship lender nances rms with good projects with which it
has a lending relationship under the contract
 
R; 0

. The local bank nances rms with bad projects
with which it has a lending relationship under the contract (X; 0). Following the occurrence of a
liquidity shock, the foreign bank nances the rms with good projects with which it has a lending
relationship under the contract (X; 0), and nances all other rms with good projects under the
monopoly collateral contract.
The lemma illustrates, that the foreign banks presence reinforces the local banks incentives
to engage in risk shifting. Prior to the entry of the foreign bank, the local bank nances rms
with bad projects only in state Pt = (PB; PB). Following the entry of the foreign bank, when
the local bank is the relationship lender to type D rms, it engages in risk shifting in state P1 2
f(PB; PG) ; (PB; PB)g, and when it is the relationship lender to type I rms, it engages in risk
shifting in state P1 2 f(PG; PB) ; (PB; PB)g. The strenghtening of the local banks incentives to
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engage in risk shifting is driven by the segmentation of the credit market. If the foreign bank is
the relationship lender to type I rms, in state (PB; PG) it has the information advantage which
allows it to retain type I rms. The local banks prots are zero when it refrains from lending,
so limited liability implies, that when the foreign bank is the relationship lender to type I rms,
it is optimal for the local bank to nance rms with bad projects when P1 = (PB; PG). Similarly,
when the foreign bank is the relationship lender to type D rms, limited liability implies that it
is optimal for the local bank to engage in risk shifting when P1 = (PG; PB). Last, if the local
bank fails to raise deposits, the foreign bank o¤ers the monopoly contracts and nances all rms
with good projects. Thus, the foreign bank isolates the local rmsfrom the occurrence of liquidity
shocks.
At time t = 0, the banks compete under asymmetric information, and the local bank is the rela-
tionship lender to both types of rms. The entrant has the choice between two di¤erent contracts.
It can o¤er the competitive collateral contract and obtain zero expected prots, or it can o¤er a
non-collateralised type contingent contract (the "pooling contract"). If the entrant o¤ers the latter,
it can set the terms of the contract contingent on the public signal, but not contingent on whether
the rm has a good or a bad project. Thus, the pooling contract su¤ers from the ine¢ ciency that,
given the rms type, it pools loan applicants with good and bad projects.
To determine the optimal loan contracts at time t = 0, let  be the lowest value of the public
signal at which the local bank can raise deposits. Let Rkt;j and 
k
t;j be respectively the lending rate
and the expected prots to bank k from lending to a type j rm at time t, where j 2 fD; Ig and
k 2 fL;Fg represents whether the bank is local, L, or foreign, F . Let kj be the present value of
bank ks expected prots from lending to a type j rm, i.e. kj =
1P
t=0
kt;j , and let t;k be the deposit
rate o¤ered by bank k at time t.
If, at time t = 0, the foreign bank o¤ers the pooling contract, the present value of its expected
prots from nancing a type j rm is,
Fj =
 
P0;jR
F
0;j  Rf

+ E0
 
F1;j

, (2)
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where,
E0
 
F1;I

= Pr (PI = PG \ 1  )c + Pr (PI = PG \ 1 < ) (PGX  Rf ) , (3)
E0
 
F1;D

= Pr (PD = PG \ 1  )c + Pr (PD = PG \ 1 < ) (PGX  Rf ) , (4)
and,
P0;j = Pr (Pj = PGj0)PG + Pr (Pj = PBj0)PB.
Expression (2) is the sum of the foreign banks expected prots from the rst and the second period.
The prots from the rst period derives from the pooling contract. These prots depend on the
realisation of the public signal, since this determines the foreign banks beliefs about the expected
success probability of a type j rm, P0;j . For all values of the public signal, the foreign bank assigns a
positive probability to the event Pj = PB, so P0;j < PG. This reects the ine¢ ciency of the pooling
contract. The foreign banks expected prots from the second period, expression (3) and (4),
contains two terms. The rst term is the information rents that accrue to the relationship lender.
By lending to the rm in the rst period, in the second period the foreign bank is the relationship
lender and holds the information advantage. The second term reects, that if a liquidity shock
occurs at time t = 1, the foreign bank is the monopoly lender and therefore extracts the monopoly
rents.
The most competitive pooling contract that the foreign bank can o¤er at time t = 0, sets the
lending rate such that the present value of the foreign banks expected prots are zero. Thus, the
interest rate on the most competitive pooling contract is given by,
RF0;j =
Rf
P0;j
  1P0;jE0
 
F1;j

.
At time t = 0, the present value of the local banks expected prots from nancing a type j rm
with a good project is given by,
Lj = PG
 
RL0;j   0;L

+ E0
 
L1;j

, (5)
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where,
E0
 
L1;I

= Pr (PI = PG \ 1  )c (6)
+Pr (PI = PB \ 1  )PB (X   E0 [1;Lj1  ; PI = PB]) , (7)
and,
E0
 
L1;D

= Pr (PD = PG \ 1  )c
+ Pr (PD = PB \ 1  )PB (X   E0 [1;Lj1  ; PD = PB]) . (8)
The rst term in expression (5) is the local banks expected prots from the rst period. At time
t = 0, the local bank is the relationship lender, so the public signal a¤ects the rst period prots
only through its impact on the deposit rate. The second term in (5) is the local banks expected
prots from period two. These prots, expression (6) and (8), reect the information rents that
accure to the local bank if it remains the relationship lender in the second period, and the rents
that accrue to the local bank from risk shifting.
The most competitive lending rate that the local bank can o¤er to a type j rm, is set such that
the present value of the local banks expected prots is zero. Thus, the most competitive lending
rate that the local bank can o¤er to rms with good projects is at time t = 0 given by,
RL0;j = 0;L  
1
PG
E0
 
L1;j

(9)
The most competitive pooling contract, and the incumbents most competitive contract di¤er
in two repsects. First, the ine¢ ciency of the pooling contract implies, that the default rate on the
entrants portfolio exceeds the default rate on the incumbents portfolio.8 This e¤ect is measured
by the term, 1P0;j >
1
PG
, and tends to push the entrants lending rate above the incuments lending
rate. Second, under the most competitive contracts, both banks use their expected future prots to
reduce the lending rate at time zero. The banks expected prots from period two di¤ers, because
the foreign entrant can nance solvent rms at the monopoly rate when the local economy is subject
8The term default rate refers to the probability that the projects in the banks loan portfolio fails.
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to a liqudity shock. This e¤ect tends to push the local banks lending rate above the lending rate
o¤ered by the foreign bank.
There are no collateral requirements under the pooling contract or under the contract o¤ered
by the local bank, so the rm accepts the contract with the lowest lending rate. Thus, a necessary
condition for a segmentation of the credit market is that RF0;D  RL0;D and RF0;I  RL0;I . Lemma 8
lists the necessary conditions for this to be fullled.
Lemma 8 A necessary condition for a segmentation of the credit market is that RF0;D  RL0;D and
RF0;I  RL0;I . These conditions are fullled if,
P0;DL;0  Rf +

1 
P0;D
PG

Pr (PD = PG \ 1  )c
+ Pr (PD = PG \  < ) (PGX  Rf )
 
P0;D Pr (PD = PB \   )PB (X   E0 [1;Lj1  ; PD = PB])
PG
 0 (10)
and
P0;IL;0  Rf +

1 
P0;I
PG

Pr (PI = PG \   )c
+ Pr (PI = PG \  < ) (PGX  Rf )
  Pr (PI = PB \ 1  
)PB (X   E0 [1;Lj1  ; PI = PB])
PG
 0 (11)
Intuitively, condition (10) and (11) ensure, that the foreign bank is the most competitive lender
to type I rms, and that the local bank is the most competitive lender to type D rms. The foreign
bank attains its competitive advantage from the ability to nance local rms with good projects
during local liquidity shocks. This advantage has to be o¤set against the local banks superior
information at time t = 0. As illustrated, liquidity shocks are more frequent when type I rms
hold good projects than when type D rms hold good projects. This implies, that the entrant has
a greater advantage in the competition for type I rms than in the competition for type D rms.
Consequently, if the entrant nances type D rms, it will also nance type I rms. The converse
is not true, so if both of the banks are active in equilibrium, the credit market must be segmented.
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In the following, I assume that condition (10) and (11) are fullled.
As an alternative to the pooling contract, the foreign bank can o¤er collateralised loans in both
periods. Under this stategy, the foreign bank o¤ers the competitive collateral contract when the
local economy is not subject to a liquidity shocks, and the monopoly collateral contract when the
local economy is subject to a liquidity shock. This strategy allows the foreign bank to eliminate
the ine¢ ciency of the pooling contract, and to capture the monopoly rents when the local economy
is subject to a liquidity shock. The cost of the strategy is two fold. First, the foreign bank
surrenders the expected relationship rents from the second period, and second, if the credit market
segmentation increases the occurence of liquidity shocks, i.e. if  < , it reduces the likelihood
that the entrant becomes the monopoly lender in the second period. Consequently, it is optimal
for the foreign bank to o¤er the pooling contract when the relationship rents are high, and when
the credit market segmentation increases the occurrence of liquidity shocks. Lemma 9 provides the
conditions under which it is optimal for the foreign entrant to o¤er the pooling contract to type I
rms.
Lemma 9 The entrant o¤ers the pooling contract to type I rms at time t = 0 only if,
 
P0;I0;L  Rf

+

1 
P0;I
PG

Pr (PI = PG \   )c+
(PGX  Rf ) [Pr ( <  \ PI = PG)  Pr ( <  \ PI = PG)]  0. (12)
Condition (12) illustrates, that when the credit market segmentation increases the occurrence of
liquidity shocks (the third term of expression (12)), and when the relationship rents are high (the
second term of expression (12)), it is optimal for the foreign bank to o¤er the pooling contract. In
the following, I assume that condition (12) is fullled.
In combination, Lemma 8 and 9 implies, that the foreign bank enters at time t = 0, and that the
entry leads to a segmentation of the credit market. The subsequent section analysis the depositors
problem, and explores how the presence of the foreign bank a¤ects the occurrence of liquidity
shocks.
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4.3 The depositorsproblem
The depositors use the public signal to form beliefs about the true state of the local economy. The
presence of the foreign bank does not a¤ect the depositorsinformation set, so the depositors beliefs
are given by (1).
The noise in the public signal implies, that for all possible state realisations, the depositors
assign a positive probability to the event PD = PB. When PD = PB, the local bank nances rms
with unprotable projects, so in these states it is optimal for the depositors to redeem their demand
deposits and invest in the risk-free asset. This implies, that when the public signal is su¢ ciently
adverse, i.e. when t < 
, the local bank fails to raise deposits.
As an additional condition, the depositors invest in demand deposits only when the expected
return on demand deposits weakly exceeds the expected return on the risk-free asset. Consequently,
for any given value of the public signal, there is a lower bound on the deposit rate, such that the
depositors nance the bank only if the deposit rate exceeds this lower bound.
Lemma 10 formalises these observations and characterises the behaviour of the depositors. Im-
portantly, Lemma 10 highlights, that the presence of the foreign bank frustrates the local banks
ability to raise deposits.
Lemma 10 There is a unique value of t, , such that, the depositors nance the local bank if
and only if t   and t  t . Furthermore,  > .
Lemma 10 illustrates, that the foreign banks presence raises the occurrence of liquidity shocks,
i.e.  > . Two e¤ects contribute to this result. First, the foreign bank raises competition.
This forces the local bank to reduce its lending rate and thereby the interest rate it can pay on
demand deposits. This lowers the expected return on demand deposits and weakens the depositors
incentives to nance the bank. This e¤ect arises purely from competition, and is independent of
whether the entrant is a foreign or a local bank. Second, the entry by the foreign bank reduces
the diversication of the local banks loan portfolio and aggravates the agency problem. Prior to
the entry of the foreign bank, the local bank engaged in risk shifting when P0 = (PB; PB). The
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entry by the foreign bank leads to a market segmentation which causes the local bank to engage
in risk shifting for P0 2 f(PB; PG) ; (PB; PB)g. To protect themselves against risk shifting, the
depositors withdraw from the local bank for higher values of the public signal. The second e¤ect is
completely driven by the segmentation of the credit market, and would not occur if the entrant was
a local bank. Thus, Lemma 10 suggests, that the resilience of the local bank depends on whether
it competes with a local or a foreign entrant.
Proposition 11 gathers the insights from the previous lemmas, and characterises the equilbrium
post the entry of the foreign bank.
Proposition 11 Under condition (10), (11) and (12), foreign entry leads to a segmentation of the
credit market. In equilibrium, the foreign bank nances type I rms under the pooling contract,
RL0;I ; 0

, and the local bank nances type D rms under the contract,
 
R; 0

. Foreign entry
increases the occurrence of liquidity shocks, as  > .
The equilibrium reveals a feature which is novel to the literature on foreign bank entry. In extant
models, the entrant contests the incumbents information advantage through the access to a cheaper
source of nance. In the model presented above, the entrant and the incumbent pays the same risk
adjusted price for deposits. The entrant mitigates the incumbents information advantage through
its ability to provide nance to creditworthy rms in states where the local nancial system is
subject to a liqudity shock. The segmentation of the credit market arises, because this service is of
particular value to rms with a low exposure to the local business conditions. Banks in developing
economies are more frequently subject to liquidity shocks than banks in developed economies, so
this analysis is predominantly relevant for foreign bank entry into developing economies.9
The structure of the equilibrium suggests, that competition is more severe following entry by a
foreign nancial intermediary than following entry by a local nancial intermediary. The foreign
bank increases competition via two channels. First, it o¤ers local rms an alternative source of
9Through 1980-2005, the average standard deviation of real cost of deposits was 1.6% in G7 countries but 12.9% in 25 major
emerging markets. The standard deviation of real demand deposit growth was 14% for G7 economies and 24% for the 25 major
emerging markets (See Mian and Khwaja (2006) for further discussion). For a discussion of the correlation between the variance
in deposits and variance in bank credit see Mian and Khwaja (2006) or Berlin and Mester (1999).
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nance, which forces the local bank to rennounce some of its monopoly rents. This is a general
feature of increased competition, and does not depend on whether the entrant is a local or foreign
bank. Second, the foreign banks ability to supply nance when the local economy goes through
a bust, provides it with expected monopoly rents that can be used to ease the terms of its loan
contracts further. This e¤ect arises only when the entrant is a foreign bank.
4.4 Welfare considerations
The foreign bank enhances the e¢ ciency of the local nancial system by eliminating events where
rms with good projects fail to raise nance. On the ip side, the local banks information about
type I rms is discarded and, on average, rms with bad projects are nanced under the foreign
banks pooling contract. Overall, welfare is improved if the failure to nance good projects is costly
relative to the cost of nancing bad projects. That is, at time t, welfare is improved if
Pr (t < 
) [Pr (PD = PGjt < ) + (1  ) Pr (PI = PGjt < )] (PGX  Rf )
  (1  ) Pr (PI = PB) (Rf   PBX)  0
The stylized framework presented in this paper ignores many of the costs and benets of foreign
bank entry. As illustrated in the model, foreign entry can cause a contraction of the lending
spreads.10 In the model, the demand for credit is inelastic, so this does not a¤ect aggregate
welfare. However, with an elastic demand for credit, tighter lending spreads can increase welfare
by increasing the number of entrepreneurs with good projects that apply for nance.11
Extant literature illustrates, that competition between nancial intermediaries can lead to
greater nancial instability.12 In the model, the local banks ability to raise deposits is frustrated
by the presence of the foreign bank. When the local economy is subject to a liquidty shock, the
foreign bank nances all the entrepreneurs with good projects, so this does not have any welfare
10The lending spread is dened as the di¤erence between the interest rate on loans and the interest rate on deposits.
11For empirical support of this mechanisms, see Demirgüç-Kunt et. al. (1999), Claessens et. al. (2001) or Peria et. al.(2002)
12See Allen and Gale (2004) for a survey.
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e¤ects. However, the model ignores that liquidity shocks involve large redistributions of wealth,
which are generally not neutral from a welfare persepective.13
The model illustrates, that even if the foreign bank extends credit as the local economy goes
through a bust, this does not imply that the foreign bank enhances the nancial stability of the
local economy. In the model, the foreign bank lends during local liquidity shocks, but its presence
increases the occurrence of liquidity shocks.
BIS (2004) and BIS (2005) argue, that the presence of a reputable foreign nancial institution
may enhance the stability of the local economy by allowing local depositorsight to quality without
a negative impact on the capital account. Proposition 5 provides a theoretical rationale for this
line of reasoning.
5 Empirical implications and evidence
5.1 Empirical implications
The model has a set of testable implications. First, the credit market segmentation suggests, that
rms that produce for export obtain credit from the foreign entrant, and rms that produce for
the local market are nanced by the local bank. Note, that if the rms that produce for export
are large relative to the rms that produce for local consumption, this prediction coincides with
the predictions from the information based theories of credit market segmentation.14 Second, the
foreign bank is a more stable source of nance than the local bank, and foreign nance does not
contract as the local business conditions deteriorate. Third, local banks are more exposed to
liquidity shocks following the entry of foreign banks. Last, foreign entry improves the nancing
conditions for all rms in the local economy.
13The model predicts, that the foreign entrant makes substantial rents during the bust which reduces local rms realised
prots.
14Stein (2002) and Berger and Udell (2002).
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5.2 Empirical evidence
The empirical tests of clientele e¤ects following the entry of foreign banks into developing economies
are complicated by the lack of data on bank and rm relationships, so most empirical results rest
on surveys and interviews with bank managers. One exception is Mian (2006) which analyses a
detailed data set for Pakistan. Mian nds, that local banks lend to small rms and that foreign
banks lend to large rms. This nding is interpreted as evidence that information ctions and
agency problems prevent the foreign entrant from lending to small rms. The dataset however,
also indicates that sectors with large exports tend to borrow from foreign banks, and therefore, it
does not reject the hypothesis presented in this paper.
Based on questionnaire surveys and interviews with bank managers, Galac and Kraft (2000)
nds, that one of the most important activities of foreign entrants in Croatia was import-export
nancing. In addition, some of the foreign bank managers stated that they nanced exporters
only. Konopielko (1999) conducts a survey among foreign bank managers in Poland, Hungary and
Czech Republic and nds, that the foreign banksmain objectives were to nance foreign trade and
support existing clients.15 Haas and Naaborg (2005a) conducts a survey among managers of foreign
banks with a presence in Central Eastern Europe and the Baltic States and nds, that upon entry,
the foreign banksobjective was to nance multinational rms. In addition, their survey indicates,
that as a result of increasing competition, the foreign banksobjective changed over time.
A wide range of empirical literature analyses the behaviour of foreign entrants during busts of
the local economies. Overall, this literature nds, that foreign banks continue to lend as the local
economy goes through a recession.
Haas and Naaborg (2005a) and Haas and Lelyveld (2006) nd, that foreign banks in Central
and Eastern Europe maintained credit outstanding during the nancial turmoil in the 1990s. Galac
and Kraft (2000) nds, that foreign banks with a physical presence in Croatia expanded both direct
lending and the supply of liquidity in the interbank market during the banking crisis of the late
15As a specic example, Citibank was the 20th bank in terms of loan volumes but the second largest bank in terms of foreign
trade nance (Konopielko (1999)).
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1990s. Consistent with the models predictions, foreign entrants in Croatia appear to have made
considerable prots from their operations during the banking crisis.
Goldberg et al. (2000) analyse data for Mexico and Argentina and nd, that during the periods
of nancial unrest in the 1990s, the credit growth of foreign banks was less volatile than the credit
growth of local banks. These periods of unrest were characterised by depositor ight to quality,
and the authors interpret their ndings as evidence that access to a more stable source of nance
allowed the foreign banks to maintain their credit outstanding. Peria and Moody (2002) and Peek
and Rosengren (2000) support this nding in their analysis of a range of Latin American countries.
Goldberg (2001) analyses the lending behaviour of US banks in emerging markets, and nd this
to be uncorrelated with the real demand cycles of the local markets. The author interprets this
as evidence that US banks with a physical presence in emerging markets tend to maintain their
supply of credit when the local economy goes through a bust.
6 Conclusion
Extant theories on foreign bank entry predict, that information asymmetries between foreign and
local banks, and di¤erences in their the costs of nance, can create clientele e¤ects which lead to
a segmentation of the credit market. Under this segmentation, the foreign bank nances the best
and most transparent of the local rms. This paper has presented an alternative theory of the
clientele e¤ects that arise from foreign bank entry. The theory emphasises, that distinct features
of the foreign banks business renders it well suited to nance local rms with a low exposure
to local business conditions. The diversication of the foreign banks business provides it with a
stable source of nance, and permits it to maintain credit outstanding as the local economy goes
through a bust. This creates a segmentation of the credit market, as the ability to raise nance
during a downturn of the local economy is important to rms whose business opportunities have a
low correlation with the state of the local economy. Thus, foreign banks nance rms with a low
exposure to the local business conditions and local banks nance rms with a high exposure to the
local business conditions.
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The segmentation of the credit market is along risk factors, so it reduces the diversication of
the local banks loan portfolio. This aggravates the local banks agency problems and increases the
occurrence of liquidity shocks. Thus, the model presented in this paper suggests, that foreign bank
entry increases the vulnerability of the local nancial intermediaries.
The models empirical implications nd some support in existing empirical work with the caveat
that much of the evidence on market segmentation, due to data constraints, is based on survey
data.
The interpretation of the model presented in this paper, and the reading of its predictions
can be widened along two lines. First, the local banks demand deposits can be interpreted as
nance originated in the international interbank market. Typically, interbank nance to banks
in developing economies has a short tenure, and is subject to the same reversals as the demand
deposits analysed in this paper. Under this interpretation, the local banks agency problem renders
its access to interbank nance is unstable. In contrast, the diversication of the foreign banks
business implies, that interbank is a stable source of nance to the foreign entrant.
Second, the segmentation of the credit market can be interpreted as a result of the entrants
ability to provide a range of services which are particularly valuable to rms producing for export.
These services could relate to the rms daily operations, such as the ability to settle trades in
di¤erent currencies, or to risk management and nance issues, such as the ability to originate
and distribute debt securities denominated in foreign currencies. Under this interpretation, the
segmentation of the credit market occurs because the prole of the services o¤ered by the foreign
bank is a better match to the rms producing for export than to the rms producing for the local
economy.
To assess the welfare implications of foreign competition, it is important to understand how the
presence of foreign banks a¤ects the local credit market. This paper is silent on a range of questions
which are important in this respect. For example, how important is the foreign banks mode of
entry (greeneld entry versus acquisition versus cross border lending)? And, how does the entrant
and the incumbent interact in the deposit and interbank markets? An analysis of these questions
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can shed more light on how foreign banks a¤ect the local nancial system, and on the particular
features of the local economy which may render foreign entry welfare enhancing.
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7 Appendix
Proof. Lemma 1. The parameter constraint, Rf > X > (1  )X implies, that when the bank
nances both types of rms, they must both succeed for the bank to repay depositors in full. The
bank is protected by limited liability, so in state (PB; PB), the expected return from nancing only
type D rms is
PB (X   ) .
 > 12 , so PB (X   ) > (1  )PB (X   ) and therefore, if the local bank nances only one type
of rm, it nances the type D rms. Under limited liability, nancing both types of rms yields a
return of
P 2B (X   ) ,
and since  > PB, it follows that
PB (X   ) > P 2B (X   ) .
Thus, in state (PB; PB) the local bank nances only type D rms.
In state (PG; PB), the return to nancing only type D rms is given by
PG (X   ) .
The return to nancing type I rms is
(1  )PB (X   ) ,
and since  > (1  ) and PG > PB, it follows that if the bank nances only one type of rm, it
nances type D rms. Under limited liability, the return from nancing all rms is given by
PBPG (X   ) .
Since  > PB,
PG (X   ) > PBPG (X   ) ,
so the local bank nances only type D rms.
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In state (PB; PG), the return to nancing type D rms is given by
PB (X   ) ,
and the return to nancing only type I rms is given by
(1  )PG (X   ) .
Since (1  ) > PB and PG >  it follows that, if the local bank nances only one type of rm, it
nances type I rms. The return from nancing both types of rms is,
PGPB (X   ) ,
and since (1  ) > PB it follows that
(1  )PG (X   PG) > PGPB (X   ) .
Thus, in state (PB; PG), the local bank only nances type I rms.
Last, in state (PG; PG) the return to the limited liability bank from nancing both types of rms
is given by
P 2G (X   ) ,
and the return from nancing only type D rms is,
PG (X   ) ,
so since PG > , it follows that
P 2G (X   ) > PB (X   ) .
Thus, in state (PG; PG) the local bank nances both types of rms (it follows straight forward that
it is never optimal for the local bank to nance type I rms only). This veries the claim in the
lemma.
Proof. Lemma 2. The depositors nance the bank if the expected return on demand deposits
weakly exceeds the return on the risk-free asset. The expected return on demand deposits is
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increasing in t, so since t  X, it follows that  solves
Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) jt) (PBX  Rf ) + Pr (Pt = (PG; PG) jt) (PGX  Rf )
+ Pr (Pt = (PG; PB) jt) (PGX  Rf ) + (1  ) Pr (Pt = (PB; PG) jt) (PGX  Rf ) = 0,
Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) jt) (PBX  Rf ) + [1  Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) jt)] (PGX  Rf ) = 0
[Pr (P = (PB; PB) jt)PB + (1  Pr (P = (PB; PB) jt))PG]X = Rf . (13)
There is a unique value of  that solves expression (13). This follows since the left hand side of
(13) is continous and strictly increasing in t, and it goes to  (PBX  Rf ) < 0for  =  1 and to
PGX  Rf > 0 for  !1.
Depositors nance the local bank if the expected return on demand deposits, conditional on
the realisation of the public signal and the banks lending policy, weakly exceeds the return on the
risk-free asset. That is, depositors invests in demand deposits if t  t , where t solves,
[Pr (Pt = (PB; PG) jt) + Pr (Pt = (PG; PB) jt)]PGt
+ Pr (Pt = (PG; PG) jt)

P 2Gt + PG (1  PG)X

+ Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) jt)PBt = Rf : (14)
Proof. Proposition 4. The proof follows directly from Lemma 1 and the presiding discussion.
Proof. Proposition 5. The proof consists of three lemmas which in conjunction verify the
proposition.
Lemma 12 If the foreign bank nances loan applicants with bad projects, it will do so in a nite
number of economies only.
Proof. Assume that all rms in all economies hold bad projects. Let n be the number of economies
in which the foreign bank lends, and let i be the number of economies with successful outcomes.
Let E (t (n)) be foreign banks expected prots. The banks prots are increasing in the lending
rate, so assume that the bank lends at X. Assume that the foreign bank nances only type I rms
(that indeed this is the case is veried in 11). Limited liability implies that the foreign bank obtains
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positive prots if i > IX n, where I is the foreign banks deposit rate. Thus, the optimal n solves,
max
n
E (t (n)) = max
n
(1  )
n

i=
I
X
n

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n i (iX   nI) :
It follows that,
(1  )
n

i=
I
X
n

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n i (iX   nI)
= (1  )n
n

i=
I
X
n

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n i
(iX   nI)
n
 (1  ) (X   I)n
n

i=
I
X
n

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n i
= (1  ) (X   I)nPr

i  I
X
n

= (1  ) (X   I)nPr

i
n
X  I

:
lim
n!1
i
n = PB, so limn!1
i
nX = PBX < Rf < I . Thus, a  > 0 can be found such that (PB + )X <
I , and, for every such , there exists an n < 1, ~n, such that
 i
~n   PB
 < . Consequently,
Pr
 
i
~nX  I
  Pr ((PB + )X  I) = 0 so nPr   inX  I = 0 for all n  ~n and therefore
E (t (n)) = 0 for n  ~n. E (t (n)) is closed and E (t (1)) = (1  )PB (X   I) > 0, so there is
an optimal n, n, with n 2 [1; ~n).
Lemma 13 Let  be the average fraction of rms with good projects. If  > 0, then there exists a
value N such that the foreign bank lends only to rms with good projects if N > N.
Proof. Let  be the average fraction of type I rms with good projects in each economy, i.e.
 =  (1  ), and c be the average fraction of type I rms with bad projects in each economy,
i.e. c = (1  ) (1  ). Let E (tj (yG; yB)) be the foreign banks expected prots when it nances
good projects with a measure yG and bad projects with a measure yB. Let i be the number of
economies where type I rms with good projects are successful and l be the number of economies
where type I rms with bad projects are successful. The banks prots from lending to rms with
good projects are positive when i > IX N . By the law of large numbers, the number of economies
where type I rms hold good projects is N . Thus since the foreign bank is protected by limited
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liability,
E (tj (N; 0)) =
N

i=
I
X
N

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N i (i (1  )X   NI) :
Let n be number of economies in which the foreign bank nances rms with bad projects. By the
previous lemma, n is nite. Then,
E (tj (N; cn))
= max[
I
X
(1 )n

l=0

n
l

P lB (1  PB)n
 l (l (1  )X   cnI)
+
n

l=
I
X
(1 )n+1

n
l

P lB (1  PB)n
 l (l (1  )X   cnI)
+
I
X
N

i=0

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N i (i (1  )X   NI)
+
N

i=
I
X
N+1

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N i (i (1  )X   NI) ; 0]: (15)
Note that the rst two terms is the return to nancing rms with bad projects in n economies.
Since n is nite, the value of these two expressions is nite. The third and fourth terms is the
return on nancing rms with good projects in N economies. Thus,
I
X
N

i=0

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N
 i (i (1  )X   NI)
+
N

i=
I
X
N+1

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N
 i (i (1  )X   NI)
= (1  )XPGN   NI
= (1  )N [PGX   I ] :
Since n is nite and the outcome of the projects is independent across the economies, there is a
value of N , N, such that I  PGX. Therefore, the expected return from nancing rms with
good projects is increasing in N, so there must be a value of N such that the third and the
fourth term in (15) exceeds the rst and the second term in (15). Consequently, when N  N,
the foreign banks limited liability can be ignored. Further, the third term in (15) goes to zero as
N increases. To see this, note that
I
X
N

i=0

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N i (i (1  )X   NI)
 0;
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and
I
X
N

i=0

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N i (i (1  )X   NI)
  IN
I
X
N

i=0

N
i

P iG (1  PG)N i
=  IN Pr

i  N I
X

=  IN Pr

i
N
 I
X

:
By the law of large numbers, lim
N!1
i
N = PG, so for any   PG (1  PG), there is a value of N ,
N, such that iN  PG   . For N  N,
 IN Pr

i
N
 I
X

  IN Pr

PG     I
X

:
As noted, since n is nite, the diversication of the foreign banks portfolio implies that lim
N!1
I 
Rf
PG
. Thus,
lim
N!1
Pr

PG     I
X

 Pr
 
PG    
Rf
PG
X
!
 Pr

X

1  PG (1  PG)
PG

 Rf

= Pr (PGX  Rf ) = 0:
Therefore,
 IN Pr

PG     I
X

= 0;
and the third term of (15) goes to zero as claimed. Consequently,
E (tj (N; cn)) = E (tj (N; 0))
+
I
X
(1 )n

i=0

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n
 i (iX   cnI)
+
n

i=
I
X
(1=)n+1

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n
 i (iX   cnI)
< E (tj (N; 0)) ;
where the last inequality follows since the second and third term equals the expected return on bad
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projects in n economies. Consequently, it is optimal for the international bank to nance only
rms with good projects if N  N.
Lemma 14 If Pr (PI = PG) > 0, then there exists a number of markets, N  N, such that the
foreign bank can always raise deposits when it is active in more than N markets.
Proof. Dene 0  Pr (PI = PG). For N  N, the foreign bank nances rms with bad projects
only if  = 0. Let kt be the public signal observed by rms in economy k. Then, the probability
that rms in economy k assign to the event  = 0 is
Pr

 = 0jkt < 

= Pr

PI = PBjkt

[Pr (PI = PB)]
N 1 .
Let the rate at which the foreign bank lends to rms be given by R. Conjecture that in equilibrium,
PG R > Rf . That indeed this is the case is veried in Proposition 11. Consider a state where
kt < 
. Let n be as dened in the previous lemma, and let N 0 be the number of economies in
which the foreign bank must be active to attract deposits from depositors in economy k. Then N 0
solves
h
1  Pr

 = 0jkt
i
24 IR 0N
i=0

0N
i

P iG (1  PG)
0N i i R
0N
+
0N

i=
I
R
0N+1

0N
i

P iG (1  PG)
0N i I
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+ Pr

 = 0jkt
24 IR n
i=0

n
i

P iB
 
1  P iB
n i i R
n
+
n

i=
I
R
n+1

n
i

P iB (1  PB)n
 i I
35
 Rf ;
where i
R
0N and
i R
n are the depositors repayment when the return on the banks portfolio is insu¢ -
cient to repay the depositors in full. The maximal deposit rate that the bank can credibly promise
its depositors is equal to the rate it charges its rms, so I  R. Let I = R. Thus, N 0 is the lowest
value of N which ensures,
h
1  Pr

 = 0jkt
i"0N

i=0

0N
i

P iG (1  PG)
0N i i R
0N
#
+ Pr

 = 0jkt
 n

i=0

n
i

P iB
 
1  P iB
n i i R
n

 Rf : (16)
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lim
N!1
Pr
 
 = 0jkt < 

= 0, so for N !1, the left hand side of (16) goes to
0N

i=0

0N
i

P iG (1  PG)
0N i i R
0N
0NPG R
0N
= PG R > Rf .
lim
N!1
Pr
 
 = 0jkt < 

= Pr
 
Pt = (PB; PB) jkt < 

, so for N ! 1, the left hand side of (16)
goes to
Pr

Pt 6= (PB; PB) jkt

PB R+
h
1  Pr

Pt = (PB; PB) jkt
i
PG R < Rf ,
where the inequality follows since kt < 
. Thus, for any given realisation of the public signal, kt ,
there is a value of N , N = min (N 0; N), such that depositors in economy k are willing to nance
the foreign bank. Note, that if kt  , the depositors will nance both the foreign and the local
bank.
Proof. Lemma 6. The incentive and compatibility constraints of the competitive collateral
contract are given by,
PB (X  R)  (1  PB)C  0;
PG (X  R)  (1  PG)C  0;
(PGR Rf ) + (1  PG)C  0;
where the third equality exploits that, when the banks loans are subject to collateral, the banks
real cost of funds is Rf . Under the contract which maximizes the surplus of the rms with good
projects, the rst and third constraint are binding, so
R =
(1  PB)Rf   (1  PG)PBX
(1  PB)PG   (1  PG)PB ;
C =
(PG   PB)Rf + (1  PG)PGPB (1 )X
(1  PB)PG   (1  PG)PB :
Indeed, this contract fulls the participation constraint of rms with good projects. If the rst
equality if fullled with equality,
C =
PB
1  PB (X  R) ,
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and therefore
PG (X  R)  (1  PG)C
= PG (X  R)  1  PG
1  PBPB (X  R)
=

PG   1  PG
1  PBPB

(X  R) > 0:
For a rm with a good project, the expected cost of a collateralised loan is
PGR+ (1  PG)C = (PG   PB)Rf + (1  PG)PGPB (1 )X
(1  PB)PG   (1  PG)PB :
Thus, if a bank o¤ers the competitive collateral contract, and the competitor can observe the quality
of the rmsprojects, then the competitor can o¤er the contract
 
R; 0

, where
PG R = PGR+ (1  PG)C ()
R =
1
PG
(PG   PB)Rf + (1  PG)PGPB (1 )X
(1  PB)PG   (1  PG)PB :
rms with good projects weakly prefer this contract to the collateral contract. Let c denote the
expected prots to the relationship lender when the competitor o¤ers a collateralized loan. Then,
c = PG R Rf
=
(1  PG)PB (1 ) (PGX  Rf )
(1  PB)PG   (1  PG)PB > 0;
where the last inequality follows since  < 1.
If a bank is the only active lender in the market and it observes only the rms type and the
public signal, then the contract which is accepted by good rms and rejected by bad rms and
which maximizes the banks prots fulls the constraints,
PG (X  R)  (1  PG)C = 0;
PB (X  R)  (1  PB)C < 0;
C = ;
where ! 0. The rst and the third equation yields,
C =  and R = X   1  PG
PG
:
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Since PB < PG, so this contract ensures that rms with bad project reject the contract. For ! 0,
this contract allows the lender to extract the monopoly prots. This veries the statements in the
lemma.
Proof. Lemma 7. To prove the lemma, I construct the strategies which supports the outcome
listed in the lemma, and show that indeed these strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium. Consider
the following strategies:
Stage 1: The relationship lender o¤ers the competitive collateral contract to rms with which it
does not have a lending relationship, and the contract
 
R; 0

to rms with good projects with which
it has a lending relationship. The local bank o¤ers the contract (X; 0) to rms with bad projects
with which it has a lending relationship.If a liquidity shocks has occurred, the foreign bank o¤ers
the contract (X; 0) to rms with good projects with which it has a lending relationship, and the
monopoly collateral contract to all other rms.
Stage 2: Recall, that for a given rms, only the relationship lender has the opportunity to change
its contract at this stage. If the non-relationship lender has o¤ered the most competitive contract
to rms with good projects at stage 1, the relationship lender matches the contract o¤ered by the
non-relationship lender to rms with good projects. If the local bank has o¤ered credit to a rm
with which it does not have a lending relationship at stage 1, the foreign bank matches the local
banks contract irrespective of whether the borrower has a good or a bad project.
These strategies support the outcome listed in the lemma and constitute a Nash equilibrium. To
see this, rst note that given the actions of the local bank, the foreign bank does not have an
incentive to deviate. The foreign banks strategy maximizes its returns from nancing rms with
which it has a lending relationship, as it nances only borrowers with good projects, and does so
at the highest possible rate given the local banks strategy. The foreign bank cannot deviate from
the contract it o¤ers to rms with which is does not have a lending relationship. If it o¤ered these
rms a non-collateralised contract, it would nance only rms with bad projects. Any collateral
contract gives an expected prot of zero, so it can also not deviate to another collateral contract.
A similar argument shows that the foreign bank cannot deviate. Note, that although the limited
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liability implies, that it may be optimal for the local bank to o¤er a non-collateralised contract
to rms with which it does not have a lending relationship, the foreign banks strategy at stage 2
deters the local bank from a deviating from the strategy outlined above.
Proof. Lemma 8. Condition (10) follows from RD0;F  RD0;L and condition (11) follows from
RI0;L  RI0;F . The proof follows directly from the discussion in the text.
Proof. Lemma 9. The foreign banks expected prots from o¤ering the competitive collateral
contract in period one and o¤ering the optimal monopoly contract in period two is given by
Pr (PI = PG \  < ) (PGX  Rf ) .
If the foreign bank o¤ers the pooling contract, the interest rate on the pooling contract is such that
the type I rm is exactly indi¤erent between accepting the pooling contract or the contract o¤ered
by the relationship lender, i.e. the foreign bank sets the interest rate in the pooling contract equal
to RI0;L. The expected prots from o¤ering the pooling contract to type I rms in period one and
lending to type I rms with good projects in period two is,
 
P0;IR
I
0;L  Rf

+ [Pr (PI = PG \   )c + Pr (PI = PG \  < ) (PGX  Rf )] :
The foreign bank o¤ers the pooling contract if
 
P0;IR
I
0;L  Rf

+ [Pr (PI = PG \   )c + Pr (PI = PG \  < ) (PGX  Rf )] >
Pr (PI = PG \  < ) (PGX  Rf ) .
Inserting the expression for RI0;L, (9), yields,
 
P0;I0;L  Rf

+

1 
P0;I
PG

Pr (PI = PG \   )c+
(PGX  Rf ) [Pr ( <  \ PI = PG)  Pr ( <  \ PI = PG)]  0.
This yields the condition in the lemma.
Proof. Lemma 10. The lower bound on the deposit rate ensures, that for a given value of the
public signal, depositors are indi¤erent between investing in demand deposits and in the risk-free
asset. The local bank lends only to type D rms, so t;D solves,
[Pr (PD = PBjt)PB + Pr (PD = PGjt)PG] t;D = Rf .
41
The depositors nance the bank when the expected return on demand deposits weakly exceeds
the return on the risk-free asset. The highest deposit rate that the bank can credibly promise
investors is given by R. A higher deposit rate is non-credible, since the local bank lends to rms
with good projects at rate R. Thus,  solves,
[Pr (PD = PBj1)PB + (1  Pr (PD = PBj1))PG] R = Rf , (17)
To see that (17) has a unique solution for , note that for  ! 1, the left hand side of the
equation goes to PG R > Rf . For  !  1, the left hand side of the equation goes to PB R < Rf .
Thus the existence of a unique solution follows from the observation that the left hand side is
continous and strictly increasing in .
To see that  > , note that if Pr (PD = PBj)  Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) j) then  > . By
(13) and (17),
[Pr (PD = PBj)PB + (1  Pr (PD = PBj))PG] R
= [Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) j)PB + (1  Pr (P = (PB; PB) j))PG]X ,
Pr (PD = PBj)PB + (1  Pr (PD = PBj))PG >
Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) j)PB + (1  Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) j))PG ,
Pr (PD = PBj) < Pr (Pt = (PB; PB) j) .
Thus,  > .
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